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Is a pro-growth strategy always the best pro-poor strategy? To address this issue, this 
paper provides an empirical evaluation of the impact of a series of pro-growth policies on 
inequality and headcount poverty. We rely on a large macroeconomic data set and 
estimate dynamic panel models that allow us to differentiate between the short- and long-
run impacts of the policies under consideration on growth, inequality and poverty. Our 
findings indicate that regardless of their impact on inequality, all the pro-growth policies 
we consider lead to lower poverty levels in the long run. However, we also find evidence 
indicating that some of these policies may lead to higher inequality and, under plausible 
assumptions for the distribution of income, to higher poverty levels in the short run. 
These findings would justify the adoption of a pro-growth policy package as the center of 
any poverty reduction strategy together with pro-poor measures that complement such a 
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I.  Introduction 
 
A large number of papers have recently explored the links between growth and inequality 
and the resulting impact on poverty reduction. Questions arising from this debate include 
whether the benefits of economic growth are broadly shared by all groups of society 
including the poor; whether a poverty reduction strategy should mainly have a growth 
bias; whether there are trade-offs between pro-growth and pro-poor growth strategies; 
and whether pro-growth policies are also the best poverty reduction policies. As a result 
of this debate, a few findings have emerged on which there seems to be a more or less 
broad consensus.  
 
First, nobody seems to doubt the importance of growth for poverty reduction. Countries 
that have historically experienced the greatest reduction in poverty are those that have 
experienced prolonged periods of sustained economic growth. In fact, there is plenty of 
evidence suggesting that the poor typically do share from rising aggregate income and do 
suffer from economic contractions. This finding is robust to the use of a relative concept 
of poverty where the poor are a pre-specified proportion of the population – usually the 
lowest quintile of the population (Dollar and Kraay (2002),  Foster and Szekely (2000)), 
or an absolute definition of poverty where the poor are those with income
1 levels below a 
pre-specified threshold – for example PPP adjusted US$1 per person per day, or a 
country-specific poverty line computed on the basis of the cost of a country-specific 
subsistence package (Ravallion and Chen (1997)).  
 
Second, progressive distributional changes are good for poverty reduction.  While on the 
one hand it is difficult to argue that poverty reduction can be achieved through 
redistributive policies in the absence of economic growth, growth associated with 
progressive distributional changes will have a greater impact in reducing poverty than 
growth that leaves the distribution unchanged. For example, Ravallion (1997), 
Bourguignon (2002), and Son and Kakwani (2003) review the poverty-growth-inequality 
relationship and note that the impact of growth on poverty is reduced when inequality is 
high. Poverty will therefore be more responsive to growth the more equal the income 
distribution. Intuitively, if the poor have a low share in existing income, they will likely 
have a low share in newly created income. 
  
Third, there is no strong empirical evidence suggesting a general tendency for growth as 
such to make income distribution more or less equal.  For example, Dollar and Kraay 
(2002) find that, on average, the income of the poorest fifth of society rises 
proportionately with average incomes. Other studies concluding that changes in income 
and changes in inequality are unrelated include Deninger and Squire (1996), Chen and 
Ravallion (1997) and Easterly (1999). Growth would thus be good for the poor, or at least 
as good as for everybody else in society.   
 
From a policy perspective, however, there is another issue that is likely to be more 
interesting than the existence of empirical regularities between growth, inequality, and 
poverty, namely what kind of policies a country should pursue in a successful poverty 
reduction strategy. Since poverty outcomes will depend on how a given policy affects 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking many of the studies exploiting absolute definitions of poverty are based on per capita 
expenditure levels and use income levels only as a substitute on data availability grounds.     -3-
growth and inequality, assessing how appropriate a particular policy is for a poverty 
reduction strategy will require knowledge about the links between policies and growth on 
the one hand and between those same policies and inequality on the other hand.   
 
On the growth front, the literature is quite rich and there are several empirical models that  
offer guidance as to the expected impact that a particular policy may have on long-run 
growth. On the inequality front, one might take the result pointing to lack of causality 
from growth to inequality mentioned above at face value and select policies on the basis 
of their expected impact on growth. However, a number of recent papers have suggested 
that many pro-growth policies might be expected also to have an impact on inequality, 
and in some cases even conflict with the growth objective. For example, work by Barro 
(2000) and Lundberg and Squire (2003) suggests that greater openness to trade 
(something to be welcomed when one has a growth objective in mind) would go along 
with more inequality. Similarly, Li and Zou (2002) present empirical evidence suggesting 
that increases in government spending, while potentially leading to lower growth, would 
also reduce inequality. Thus advice based only on the expected growth impact of policies 
could lead to unpleasant poverty outcomes (as the anti-globalization movement has been 
pointing out repeatedly over the last few years). More generally, Easterly (2001) also 
finds that structural adjustment in the context of World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund programs tends to reduce the growth elasticity of poverty, a result that would be 
consistent with a positive relationship between increases in inequality and the 
implementation of adjustment programs.  Easterly speculates that this may be due to the 
poor being ill placed to take advantage of the new opportunities created by structural 
adjustment reforms.  
 
This paper enters this debate with the main purpose of providing an empirical evaluation 
of the impact of a number of pro-growth policies on inequality and headcount poverty. In 
doing so the paper contributes to the existing literature along several dimensions. First, 
following a similar framework to that in Lundberg and Squire (2003) and Li and Zou 
(2002), the paper takes into account the possibility that some policies may simultaneously 
influence both growth and inequality.  However, contrary to other studies, we focus on 
the impact of policies on inequality changes (rather than on inequality levels). This seems 
the natural choice when interest centers on the impact of policies on poverty through 
growth and redistribution channels. 
 
Second, unlike most of the empirical studies on inequality, we move beyond the 
assessment of the impact of policies on growth and the distribution of income, and 
combine these elements to infer, under plausible assumptions, potential changes in 
poverty. This issue is likely to be relevant and not only in the context of a strategy for 
poverty reduction or achieving the Millennium Development Goals. In fact, from a policy 
perspective, the weight given to the impact that a policy has on inequality is likely to be 
relative, and to depend on the contemporaneous impact of the policy on growth. 
 
Third, our estimation results are based on dynamic panel models. In addition to taking 
into account the possibility of inequality convergence (Benabou (1996), Ravallion 
(2002)), this approach allows us to capture potential inter-temporal poverty dynamics. If 
after implementation of a pro-growth policy that has a negative impact on inequality 
there are important mismatches between when the growth and inequality effects become 
apparent, it would be plausible to find that a policy intervention increases poverty in the 
short run and decreases it in the long run. This would be the case if the inequality effect   -4-
was felt immediately but there were important lags before the bulk of the growth effect 
became noticeable. The issue is of particular interest for policy analysis because of the 
potential political economy risks associated with reform programs that lead to temporary 
increases in poverty. Further, since growth models tend to adjust very slowly (empirical 
estimates of the half-life of convergence found in the literature range from 20 to 40 
years), it would be possible that the increases in poverty would be temporary, but still 
long lasting. 
 
Fourth, at a more technical level, we take into account the possibility of fixed effects in a 
dynamic panel framework. Fixed effects can appear if some countries have a tendency to 
be more equal owing to cultural or religious considerations; by controlling for them, it is 
possible to somewhat mitigate omitted-variable bias (at least with respect to time-
invariant unobservable country characteristics).  
 
To anticipate some of the results below, we find that there is inequality convergence and 
that there is an apparent mismatch between the speeds of convergence of income and 
inequality, with inequality converging much faster than income. As indicated above, this 
could potentially lead to an increase in poverty when a policy presents a trade-off 
between its growth and inequality outcomes. On the growth-inequality links, we find a 
Kuznets type of relationship by which inequality rises with income levels up to about 
$3,000 (1985 US dollars) and falls thereafter, and find no significant evidence of 
inequality per se affecting growth. Admittedly, the point estimate for inequality comes 
close to being significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that higher inequality would 
lead to lower growth. However, even on the basis of the point estimate, our results 
suggest a small potential impact of inequality on growth: a 1 percent deterioration in the 
Gini coefficient would lead to an annual growth decline of .007 percent. 
 
At the policy level, on the one hand, we find that improvements in education and 
infrastructure and lower inflation would reduce inequality. The estimates of the 
coefficients for these variables always have the expected sign and are highly significant 
from a statistical point of view. Thus policies in these areas support both higher growth 
and lower inequality, and hence have a positive effect on poverty reduction.  
 
On the other hand, we find that financial development, trade openness, and decreases in 
the size of government would be associated with increases in inequality. Thus, policies in 
these areas present some conflict with respect to growth and inequality objectives. To the 
extent that their positive impact on growth offsets the negative impact on inequality, 
these pro-growth policies would also be pro-poor (in the sense that poverty falls as a 
result of the implementation of the policy).  Under the assumption of a log normal 
income distribution, we illustrate the expected impact that progress on these areas may 
have on (headcount) poverty levels, and find that these policies are likely to be pro-poor 
in the long run (i.e. the growth effect offsets the increase in inequality), but might also 
lead to temporary short-run increases in poverty in the absence of compensatory 
measures.  
 
We also find that financial crises would hit the better off harder than the poor and would 
therefore be associated with reduced inequality (but this is of little consolation when a 
crisis negatively affects growth and therefore the reduction in inequality occurs when 
poverty is increasing); that output volatility, in addition to slowing growth, would 
increase inequality (probably because the poor tend to be more vulnerable); that   -5-
governance may be negatively related to inequality (in the sense that better governance 
would lead to more inequality); and that external imbalances, and terms of trade shocks 
have little impact on inequality (at least from a statistical point of view).   
 
All in all, the findings of this paper suggest that pro-growth policies, regardless of their 
impact on inequality, are likely to be pro-poor in the long run.  In other words, the 
positive impact that policies have on growth should be enough to eventually offset the 
potential negative effects they may have on inequality. However, there is also a need to 
face the possibility (and its associated implications) that some reform policies may lead 
to temporary increases in poverty. This is especially the case given that in this framework 
"temporary" may span several years.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II we review some basic growth- 
inequality-poverty relationships that stress the important inter-relations between growth 
and inequality for poverty reduction. Sections III to V provide an empirical evaluation of 
the impact of a number of pro-growth policies on inequality. In Section III we discuss the 
econometric models and how they can be used to infer the impact that different policies 
have on poverty. Section IV addresses econometric issues, paying particular attention to 
the challenges involved in the estimation of a dynamic panel with country-specific 
effects, and reviews the data used in the empirical section. In section V we present the 
results for the empirical inequality model, and in section VI we link the growth and 
inequality results to draw inferences about the likely impact that changes in the policy 
determinants under consideration may have on poverty. Section VII closes the paper with 
some conclusions.  
 
II. Growth, inequality and poverty 
 
The degree of poverty in any given country depends upon two factors: the average 
income level of the country and the extent of income inequality. Formally,  
 
P=P(Y,L(p)),           ( 1 )  
 
where P is a poverty measure (which for simplicity will be assumed to belong to the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) (1984) class
2), Y is per capita income and L(p) is the 
Lorenz curve measuring the relative income distribution. L(p) is the percentage of income 
enjoyed by the bottom 100×p percent of the population.  
 
Changes in poverty can be decomposed into a growth component that relates changes in 
Y to P, and an inequality component that relates poverty to changes in inequality. In 
general, increases in average income (growth) will reduce poverty. Thus, denoting the 
growth elasticity of poverty by γ one could write: 
                                                 












=  where α is the parameter of 
inequality aversion, z is the poverty line, and x is income. For α= 0, the previous expression reduces to the 
familiar headcount ratio.  When α=1 it weights each poor person by his/her distance form the poverty line 
(the poverty gap), and when  α=2 the weight given to each poor person is proportional to the square of the 
income shortfall (squared poverty gap).  Put in other words, higher values of α would give more weight to 








= γ < 0 .           ( 2 )  
 
Measuring the effect of inequality on poverty is slightly more complex because inequality 
can change in infinite ways. Although intuitively progressive distributional change is 
likely to reduce poverty
3, this result cannot be generalized without additional 
assumptions. For example, consider the (possibly unlikely) case of a transfer from the 
extremely rich to the very (but not extremely) rich. This would improve inequality levels 
but would not affect poverty. To make the problem of the impact of inequality changes 
on poverty tractable, one possibility is to assume that income follows a log-normal 
distribution.
4  Lopez and Serven (2004) compare the theoretical quintile shares according 
to a log-normal distribution with their empirical counterparts using data from 794 
household surveys and conclude that the log normal approximation fits the empirical data 
extremely well. In turn, under this assumption it is possible to express the inequality 








= φ > 0 .           ( 3 )  
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.        ( 5 )  
 
Equation (5) indicates that the impact that a change in policy X will have on poverty will 
depend on: (i) the impact that the policy has on growth; (ii) how growth is translated into 
poverty reduction; (iii) the simultaneous impact that the policy has on inequality (as 
measured by the Gini coefficient), and finally (iv) how inequality changes are translated 
into poverty reduction. 
 
In principle, γ  and φ  could be considered to be independent of the policy in question and 
depend on the particular income distribution, the initial level of per capita income Y , the 
poverty line, and the initial level of inequality G.
5  Table 1 presents the theoretical 
elasticities of headcount poverty to growth and headcount poverty to inequality computed 
under the assumption that income follows a  log normal distribution. These elasticities are 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, for the inequality elasticity of headcount poverty to be positive it is also required that 
the level of average per capita income is above the poverty line. Otherwise, there is the risk that progressive 
distributional changes increase poverty. 
4 If the distribution of income y is log-normal, then log(y)~N(µ,σ), with G= 2 Φ(σ/√2)-1 where Φ(.) 
denotes the cumulative normal distribution (Aitchinson and Brown (1966)), and G is the Gini index. 
5 See Son and Kakwany (2003) for an excellent review of the relationship between inequality, average 
income and the elasticities of poverty.   -7-
computed for different Gini coefficients (running from .3 to .6) and different levels of 
development (expressed in terms of the share of the poverty line to per capita GDP)
6 (see 
Lopez and Serven (2004)).   
 
For example, for a country where the poverty line is 33 percent of per capita income and 
the Gini coefficient is .3, the growth elasticity of poverty would be –4 (i.e. growth of 1 
percent of GDP would reduce poverty by 4 percent) whereas the inequality elasticity 
would be 5.2 (a 1 percent increase in the Gini coefficient would increase poverty by 5.2 
percent). By contrast, in a country with the same income level but higher inequality, say a 
Gini of .6, the growth elasticity of poverty would be -.9, and the inequality elasticity 
would be 2. Thus high initial inequality levels are likely to represent a barrier to poverty 
reduction, since both the impact of growth on poverty
7 and the impact of progressive 
distributional change on poverty will be much smaller than in countries with a more equal 
income distribution.  
 
On the other hand, it is also the case that high initial poverty is also a barrier for poverty 
reduction. For example, consider the case of a country with a Gini of .4. If the country 
had per capita income levels that are six times the poverty line (row with the heading .16 
in table 1) the growth elasticity of poverty would be -3.3, whereas if the country had 
income levels that are only one and half times the poverty line (row with the .66 heading 
in table 1), this same elasticity would only be -1.2. Thus this second (and poorer) country 
would have to achieve a growth rate that is more than twice that of the first (and richer) 
country to obtain the same rate of poverty reduction. Similarly, a 1 percent decline in the 
Gini coefficient would lower poverty by .9 percent when a country has a Gini coefficient 
of .4 and the poverty line is 66 percent of per capita income levels, but would have a 
much higher impact (7.7 percent) when the poverty line is 16 percent of per capita 
income.  
 
III. The impact of policies on growth and inequality  
 
The previous section has reviewed the role that growth and inequality levels play for 
poverty reduction. It has also highlighted the fact that inferences about how a particular 
policy will affect poverty require knowledge about the impact of the policy on both 
growth and inequality. On the growth front, the literature is quite rich and there are 
several empirical models that offer guidance as to the expected impact that a particular 
policy may have on long-run growth.  On the inequality front, however, not only is the 
literature less rich but also in most cases it is based on empirical models that relate the 
level (rather than the change in the level) of inequality to policies and therefore 
complicate the analysis of poverty.  
 
The empirical models in this paper are based on the following dynamic structure:  
 
it t i it it it it x y y y υ τ ν ω δ + + + + = − − − ' 1 1 ,       ( 6 )  
 
it t i it it it it x g g g ε η µ β α + + + + = − − − ' 1 1 ,       ( 7 )  
                                                 
6 If one considers a typical poverty line, say US$1 per person per day, the reported elasticities would 
correspond to the following per capita income levels: US$2190 (.16), US$1095 (.33), US$730 (.5), US$547 
(.66), US$405 (.90) and US$331 (1.1). 
7 This point was first made by Ravallion (1997).   -8-
 
where y is the log of per capita income,  g is the log of the Gini coefficient, x represents 
the set of explanatory variables other than the lagged measure of income, ν and µ are 
unobserved country-specific effects, τ and η are time-specific effects andυ  and ε are the 
error terms. The subscripts i and t represent country and time period.   
 
Beyond expressing the impact that the coefficients of the different policies may have on 
growth and inequality, (6) and (7) can be employed to obtain estimates of how poverty 
changes would be associated to a change in policy j of  x. It must be noted, however, that 
the presence of dynamics allows us to differentiate between the immediate impact that a 
change in a given policy has on both income and inequality and the long-run impact that 
results from the dynamic feedback. For example, changes to policy j will lead in the short 
run to:
8   
 
φ β γ ω × + × = j j
j dx
dp
       ( 8 )  
 















.         ( 9 )  
 
Clearly, if the dynamics in equations (6) and (7) are similar (i.e. if δ is similar to α) then 
(9) reduces to (8) scaled up to δ =α. But if one of the variables adjusts much faster than 
the other then one should also expect to find dynamics in poverty. Figure 1 illustrates this 
point with a very simple example that assumes γ=-φ=1, δ = -.1, α =-.3,  β=.6 and ω=.3. 
This parametrization would be consistent with a policy that has a positive impact on 
growth and a negative impact on income distribution; in addition  the full impact on 
distribution is felt much faster than on growth. Inspection of figure 1 would suggest an 
initial net adverse impact on poverty (due to the increase in inequality) that later is 
reversed and, as the impact of the policy on income kicks in, poverty is reduced. 
 
The models in (6) and (7) are based on the implicit assumption that simultaneous changes 
in income and in inequality are motivated by the implementation of a given policy, and 
ignore the potential impact that growth "as such" may have on inequality and that 
inequality "as such" may have on growth. While in principle the existing empirical 
evidence seems to suggest that the growth process is not accompanied by changes in 
inequality, some authors have also found a Kuznets type of relationship between 
inequality and income levels. For example, Barro (2000) finds that the Gini index would 
rise with GDP for values of GDP of less than $1636 (in 1985 US dollars) and fall 
thereafter. Also, assuming that inequality has no impact on growth seems a bit more 
controversial. Benabou (1996), Perotti (1996), and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) find that 
inequality negatively affects growth, whereas Forbes (2000) and Li and Zou (1998) find 
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking one should also consider an error term emerging from using a discrete approximation to 
an infinitesimal interval. 
9 This assumes that δ ≠0 and α≠0. If the parameter controlling the dynamics is zero, all the adjustment 
would take place immediately.   -9-




it t i it it it it it g x y y y υ τ ν ξ ω δ + + + + + = − − − ' 1 1 ,     ( 1 0 )  
 
it t i it it it it it y x g g g ε η µ χ β α + + + + + = − − − − 1 1 1 ' .      ( 1 1 )  
 
Equations (10) and (11) would now result in different expressions for the changes in 
poverty levels which in this case would be given by: 
 
φ β γ ξβ ω × + × + = j j j
j dx
dp





















.   (13) 
 
It is evident that for ξ =χ =0, (12) and (13) reduce to (8) and (9). 
 
With respect to policies, we follow recent work by Loayza and Soto (2002) and Loayza, 
Fajnzylber and Calderon (2002) who propose an empirical growth model that focuses on 
policies that have received the most attention in academic and policy circles, and 
especially at the World Bank, in the context of structural adjustment operations. In 
addition to the lagged dependent variable, the following regressors are considered:   
cyclical reversion (captured by the output gap); human capital (logged rate of gross 
secondary enrollment);  financial development (logged ratio of private domestic credit 
supplied by private financial institutions to GDP); government burden (logged ratio of 
government consumption to GDP), infrastructure (telecommunications capacity), 
governance/institutions (first principal component of the four indicators reported by the 
International Country Risk Guide – prevalence of law and order, quality of bureaucracy, 
absence of corruption, and accountability of public officials), trade openness (volume of 
trade adjusted by country size – area and population – whether the country is landlocked, 
and whether it is an oil exporter), inflation rate, cyclical volatility (standard deviation of 
the output gap), real exchange rate misalignment, banking crisis (number of years that a 
country undergoes a banking crisis in the period under analysis), and terms of trade 
changes.  
 
IV. Estimation and data issues 
 
Estimation of equations (6) and (7) (or equivalently (10) and (11)) above poses several 
challenges including the presence of country-specific effects and the possible 
endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables with inequality. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) propose differencing the equations to eliminate country-specific effects. After 
                                                 
10  Observe that the implicit restrictions in the system given by (10) and (11) are enough to have an 
identified system. 
   -10-
accounting for time-specific effects (with the inclusion of period-specific dummies), 
equation (7) could be rewritten as
11: 
 




) ( ) ( ' ) )( 1 ( ) ( 1 1 2 1 1 − − − − − − + − + − + = − it it it it it it it it x x g g g g ε ε β α .   (15) 
 
This differencing, however, introduces a new bias since the error term (εit - εit-1) is 
correlated with the lagged dependent variable (git-1 -git-2). Under the assumptions that  the 
error term ε  is not serially correlated, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a two-step 
generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator using as moment conditions:  
 
0 )] ( [ 1 = − − − it it s it g E ε ε   for s ≥2        ( 1 6 )  
 
and if the explanatory variables x are predetermined but not strictly exogenous:   
 
0 )] ( [ 1 = − − − it it s it x E ε ε   for s ≥2 .        ( 1 7 )  
 
In the first step, the error terms are assumed to be independent and homoskedastic across 
countries and time.   In the second step, the residuals obtained in the first step are used to 
construct a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix, and thus relax the assumptions 
of independence and homoskedasticity.  Using the moment conditions in (16) and (17) 
and denoting θ=[α β’]’, the GMM estimator of θ and corresponding covariance matrix Σθ 
are given by:  
 
g Z Z x x Z Z x ' ˆ ' ) ' ˆ ' ( ˆ 1 1 1 − − − Ω Ω = θ        ( 1 8 )    
1 1 ) ' ˆ ' ( ˆ − − Ω = Σ x Z Z x θ          ( 1 9 )  
 
where x =[git-1  x ], Z is the matrix of instruments, and Ω ˆ  is  a consistent estimate of the 
covariance matrix of the moment conditions constructed with the residuals of the first 
step regression.  
 
The consistency of the GMM estimator above depends on the validity of the assumption 
that the error terms do not exhibit serial correlation as well as on the validity of the 
instruments.  We present two specification tests to address these issues. The first is the 
Sargan  test of overidentifying restrictions. The second test examines whether the error 
term ε  is not serially correlated, which in turn would imply that the difference error in 
(14) does not present second-order serial correlation. 
 
We rely on two main sources of data. Inequality data come from Dollar and Kraay’s 
database on inequality. This database expands the inequality data used in their 2002 paper 
and contains 953 observations of the Gini coefficient for 137 countries. We acknowledge 
that the Gini coefficient is less than perfect and that other measures, such as the income 
                                                 
11 Clearly, equation (6) would also be subject to a similar transformation.   -11-
share of the lowest quintile, may be more appropriate. Data availability, however, dictates 
the choice.
12 The growth determinants come from Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderon 
(2002). 
 
Our regressions are conducted using non-overlapping five-year periods spanning the 
years 1960-2000. Income and inequality data are taken from the latest available date 
within the given period. Growth and inequality determinants are averages for the five-
year period in question. These transformations would reduce the sample to 291 
observations for 87 countries for which we have at least 2 consecutive Gini coefficients. 
If we also eliminate countries with less than 3 observations (note that as implied by (16) 
and (17) we need a minimum of three observations per cross-section unit to run the 
GMM estimator outlined above), the sample is further reduced to 194 inequality 
observations for 61 countries.  
 
The original sample of growth determinants is higher and includes data for 78 countries  
and the total number of observations is 350. When both databases are merged, however, 
the number of observations available for estimation purposes is reduced to 134 cases and 
41 countries. Working with five-year averages reduces the problems associated with the 
original panel where 24 countries would account for more than half of the 953 
observations. Further, the use of at least three observations for each country (i.e. 15 
years) gives a long-run perspective to the problem that is lost with the original panel, 
where more than 30 countries have only one observation.  
 
Admittedly, using five-year periods also brings some complications. For example, the 
sample size is notoriously reduced from the original inequality database. The reduction in 
the number of observations is particularly important when one considers the estimator 
proposed above, since we are working with a large number of variables and a small cross- 
section dimension (41 countries in some cases). For example, if we were to consider the 
explanatory variables as predetermined, even limiting the maximum number of lagged 
levels to be used as instruments to two, we would still end up with 170 instruments in 
some of our specifications. Not only does the problem then become too large to estimate, 
but also the excessive number of overidentifying restrictions relative to the sample would 
dramatically affect the performance of the GMM estimator. Against this background, the 
results presented below for the models including all the policies treat as a predetermined 
variable only the lagged dependent variable.  Since the model is still overidentified, we 
can test the validity of the hypothesis that the proposed instrument set is uncorrelated 
with the error term, using the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. It must be noted 
in this regard that the employed specification tests generally support the econometric 
models. That is, Sargan and second-order correlation tests cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the models are well specified and that our instrument set is valid.
13  
 
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for the data. The logged Gini coefficient, 
would have a mean value of -.977 (equivalent to a Gini of about .37) and show 
considerable dispersion (the 2 standard deviation confidence interval would range from 
about -.43 to -1.51). The maximum logged Gini in the sample is -.296 and the minimum 
is -1.79. There is also some evidence of a skewed distribution with a long and thin upper 
                                                 
 
12 For example, using the growth rate in the income of the lowest quintile of the population would leave us 
with only one third of the observations we manage to use for the Gini regressions. 
13 The only exception to this rule is the regression of growth on the initial value of income.    -12-
tail (revealing the presence of few very unequal countries in the sample). Regarding 
changes in the (log) Gini, the average annual change between two five-year periods 
would be .1 percent, indicating that on average inequality changes little over time. 
However, there is considerable dispersion: the 2 standard deviation interval would range 
from about –6.8 percent to 6.8 percent. The changes in the Gini coefficient also present a 
skewed distribution but in this case it is toward the lower tail.  As for the income data, 
average annual growth rates between two five-year periods would be about 2 percent, but 
dispersion is also high (very similar to that found in the changes in the Gini coefficient). 
The variables that aim to represent the various aspects of economic development tend to 
be skewed toward the lower tail, something that would reveal the presence of a few very 
underdeveloped countries in the sample. The inflation rate also presents a skewed 
distribution but in this case is likely to reflect a few instances of extreme macroeconomic 
mismanagement. 
 
V. Empirical results 
 
We start this section by presenting results for equations (10) and (11) under the restriction 
that  β=ω=0. Thus equation (11) is basically reduced to a test of convergence for 
inequality considering the potential impact of income levels, whereas in equation (10) we 
explore, in addition to the speed of convergence for per capita income levels, the 
potential impact of inequality on growth.  We estimate the equations with four different 
methods: OLS, fixed effects, 2SLS
14, and the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. 
In turn, we present the results of the Arellano and Bond estimator treating the non-
lagged-dependent-variable regressor both as an exogenous variable and as a pre-
determined variable. 
 
Inspection of table 3 suggests convergence in inequality levels, with the estimators that 
take into account the possibility of fixed effects resulting in a faster speed of 
convergence. For example, while the pooled estimator suggests a half-life of about 20 
years, the other estimators suggest a half-life of between 1 and 5 years. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Benabou (1996) and Ravallion (2002)
15 who also find 
inequality convergence. Further, their estimated coefficients for the speed of convergence 
are of a similar order of magnitude to our pooled estimator. Two possible interpretations 
behind the inequality convergence given by Ravallion are related to (i) the implications 
of the neoclassical growth model (which in addition to predicting income convergence 
across countries would also predict inequality convergence), or more pragmatically to (ii) 
the widespread convergence of economic policy during the 1990s. This second argument 
is likely to weigh less, however, when we take into account the fact that we also find 
inequality convergence when we control for policy changes, and therefore for policy 
convergence. As for the impact of initial income on the changes in inequality, table 3 
does not find any significant effect, although admittedly, given how parsimonious the 
models are, this could be due to omitted variables bias.  
 
                                                 
14  In equation 10 the instruments are 3 lagged growth observations and inequality with 3 lagged values of 
inequality. In equation (11) lagged inequality is instrumented with lagged changes  in inequality and initial 
per capita income in equation (10) is instrumented with 3 lagged growth observations.  These instruments 
would be valid even in the presence of fixed effects. 
15 Ravallion uses a different estimation technique. Rather than relying on the relation between initial Gini 
and the subsequent change in the index, Ravallion (2002) measures the speed of convergence by comparing 
estimated trends in inequality with predicted initial levels of inequality.     -13-
Next we explore in table 4 the results obtained when one regresses per capita growth on 
initial income and inequality. Two main messages emerge from this table. First, the speed 
of convergence in per capita income levels seems to be much lower than the speed of 
convergence for inequality, with an estimated half-life of between 8 years (A&B 
estimators) and 40 years (2SLS estimator). The fixed-effects estimator would suggest a 
half-life of 18 years, and the pooled estimator cannot reject a null hypothesis of no 
convergence.  These results would suggest that in principle, following a shock of a 
similar magnitude to both inequality and growth,
16 the adjustment process in inequality 
would be much shorter than the adjustment in per capita income levels. In turn, as noted 
above this could produce poverty dynamics where poverty increases initially but then 
subsequently decreases. The second message emerging from the table is that inequality as 
such does not seem to affect growth. This finding would be half way between those of 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Perotti (1996), who find evidence that inequality 
negatively affects growth, and those of Li and Zhou (1998) and Forbes (2000), who find 
a positive relationship between inequality and growth.  It could be argued that this result 
is somewhat driven by the combination of countries at different levels of development. 
As noted by Galor (2000) it is possible to construct models where in the early stages of 
development inequality positively affects growth prospects, but in later stages negatively 
affects growth.  To further explore this issue, table 5 presents the results obtained when 
the previous growth regression is run for three different samples: low, middle and high-
income countries.  The results, however, remain virtually unchanged. 
 
Moving now to address the impact of different policies on growth and inequality, table 6 
reports in its first and second columns the results of two empirical growth models. The 
first column reports the results obtained by Loayza and Soto (2002). The second column 
augments that model with inequality. Two basic messages emerge from these models. 
First, inequality carries a negative sign (more inequality would be bad for growth) and 
even if it is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level, it comes quite close. 
However, even if one were to judge from the point estimate, our results suggest a small 
potential impact from inequality to growth: a 1 percent deterioration in the Gini 
coefficient would lead to an annual growth decline of .007 percent. Second, not 
surprisingly given the lack of an apparent role for inequality in the growth specification, 
the point estimates of the coefficients of the different policies are very similar to those 
obtained by Loayza and Soto. There is, however, one improvement when one includes 
inequality: governance now appears to positively affect growth whereas in the Loayza 




As for the models for inequality, table 6 presents estimates for three models. Two of them 
correspond to equations (7) and (11), whereas the third one is an augmented version of 
the model in (11) that takes into account possible non-linearities in the level of income 
(and thus tries to capture a potential Kuznets curve relationship between inequality and 
income levels).  Overall we now find evidence suggesting that income levels may have 
an impact on changes in inequality. When the basic model is augmented with the initial 
level of GDP per capita we obtain a negative (and significant) relationship between 
income levels and changes in inequality (higher income levels would be associated with 
                                                 
16 This would be consistent with growth and the changes in the log Gini having a similar standard 
deviation. 
17 Loayza and Soto (2002) results, however, are more efficient in general.   -14-
lower inequality levels). When we consider initial income and its square among the 
explanatory variables, the last column in table 6 would indicate that there appears to be 
an inverted-U relationship between the Gini value and income. In fact, this relationship 
would indicate that the Gini coefficient rises with GDP per capita values of less than 
US$2940 (1985 dollars) and declines thereafter. We also find that including the initial 
level of GDP among the regressors does not significantly affect the estimates of the 
coefficients of the policy variables under consideration. We next consider these. 
 
The results for education would indicate that countries with better education (as measured 
by secondary enrollment rates) would be less unequal.  The estimated coefficients are 
very similar in the three empirical models for inequality and of a similar order of 
magnitude to those in the growth model. These results are in line with those of Datt and 
Ravallion (2002) and Lundberg and Squire (2003). Using 20 household surveys for 
India’s 15 major states, Datt and Ravallion (2002) also conclude that poor basic 
education is an impediment to the ability of the poor to participate in opportunities for 
economic growth. Lundberg and Squire (2003) also find that education is likely to be 
correlated with both faster growth and lower income inequality. 
 
The estimated coefficient for financial development is always significant and suggests 
that progress on this front would be associated with increases in inequality. Possible 
explanations for this finding are: (i) the more educated (and likely richer) are able to 
exploit the new opportunities better; (ii) adoption of capital intensive technologies is 
likely to substitute for unskilled labor. Thus to some extent, our results would support the 
findings of Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2001) who used household data over more 
than two decades for 17 Latin American countries to estimate that the financial sector 
liberalization reforms that took place during the 1990s negatively affected income 
distribution. Within a cross-country framework, Dollar and Kraay (2002) also find that 
financial development negatively affects inequality. 
 
Contrary to financial development, where most of the available empirical results already 
suggest that more financial development implies more inequality, the available results for 
trade openness point toward less than unanimous conclusions. Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
find that trade openness positively affects income distribution. A similar result is 
obtained by  Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2001) for a set of Latin American countries. 
However, Sanchez and Schady (2003) find the opposite result in six Latin American 
countries, where trade volumes would negatively affect inequality. Spillimbergo et al 
(1999) and Barro (2000) also find that trade openness would be associated with higher 
inequality, whereas Lundberg and Squire (2003) conclude that there seems to be a 
positive correlation between the Sachs-Warner index of trade liberalization and the Gini 
coefficient. Our results give some support to the view that trade may lead to higher 
inequality.  The estimate of the trade coefficient is always positive and significant. 
Moreover, its magnitude is sizeable in the sense that it is larger than the coefficient found 
in the growth regressions.  
 
As with trade openness and financial development, our results suggest that cutting the 
size of the government is likely to lead to faster growth, but also to increases in 
inequality. The estimated coefficient for this variable is always statistically significant 
even at the 1 percent level. Thus, there is at least some evidence that governments may be 
inefficient (i.e. more government means less growth) but maybe with a benevolent face 
(i.e. more government increases equality). This result is consistent with the findings of Li   -15-
and Zou (2002), who also find that higher spending, while having a negative impact on 
growth, may positively affect inequality levels. 
 
Public infrastructure, on the other hand, is an area that belongs to the win-win category of 
policies (i.e. policies that both increase growth and reduce inequality). That is, not only 
would society as a whole be better off but also the poor would benefit more than 
proportionately. As noted by Ferreira (1995), productive public investment can 
potentially alleviate inequality even if expenditures are uniformly distributed. This would 
be the case if the poorest groups of society face a credit constraint that prevents them 
from acquiring private substitutes for infrastructure, whereas the richest class is able to 
complement the free public provision of these services. 
 
The result for the governance variable may be somewhat controversial. Here we find that 
better governance would lead to more unequal societies.  One possible reason for this 
finding is that once we control for policies, a country's preferred level of inequality is not 
related to the level of governance.  However, and given the result obtained in the basic 
growth regression (governance would negatively affect growth), this outcome could also 
be due to problems with the variable we use to capture the level of governance in the 
different countries.   
 
As for macroeconomic stability, the estimated coefficient of inflation indicates that 
inflation penalizes the poor and that countries with lower inflation would have a tendency 
to be more equal. Given that low inflation is also positively associated with faster growth, 
polices aimed at reducing inflation would also belong to the win-win category. This result 
would, therefore, be in line with the findings of Easterly and Fisher (2001), Romer and 
Romer (1998), Beherman, Birdsall and Szekely (2001), and Lundberg and Squire (2003) 
who also find that high inflation and macroeconomic instability are negatively associated 
with the incomes of the poor.   
 
Regarding financial crises, our results suggest that in turbulent times (at least in those 
countries where the turbulence is created by a financial crisis) inequality would fall. 
Sanchez and Schady (2003) find a similar result for a sample of six Latin American 
countries and explain it by noting that important downturns in the demand for tertiary 
educated workers are highly correlated with economic downturns.  Similarly, the Asian 
financial crisis that started in 1997 seems to have affected more young adult urban 
workers working in relatively well paid construction and financial sectors than the 
allegedly most vulnerable groups (Behrman, Deolalikar and Tinakron,  2000 and 2001) 
and therefore contributed to a reduction in inequality.  Clearly, one has to also note that 
since overall per capita income is also falling this is likely to be of little consolation for 
the poor who in effect will be worse off regardless of the changes in inequality. 
 
The volatility of the business cycle is also positively related to the Gini coefficient 
(sharper economic fluctuations would be associated with higher inequality), although 
admittedly in the basic inequality specification the standard deviation of the output gap is 
not significant. A possible explanation behind the finding suggesting that the amplitude 
of the business cycle is associated with higher inequality levels is that poorer groups in 
society would likely find it more difficult to insure themselves against sharp fluctuations 
in output growth.  
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As for exchange rate management policies (i.e. the degree of overvaluation), the 
coefficient is insignificant. This is another case where the findings of the empirical model 
seem to be counterintuitive: given that real exchange overvaluation would capture 
distortions in the allocation of resources between the tradable and the non tradable 
sectors, one could a priori expect this variable to play an important role in explaining the 
evolution of income distribution. Finally, regarding the evolution of the terms of trade, 
we find this variable also to negatively affect inequality (an improvement in the terms of 
trade would lead to a deterioration in income inequality), a finding that would be in line 
with the impact of trade on inequality.  
 
VI. Poverty impact of policies.  
 
The previous section has reviewed the main results obtained when one relates inequality 
to a broad set of policy variables. Overall the inequality model would suggest that there 
are some win-win policies (education, infrastructure, and macroeconomic stability) that 
could be associated with growth and progressive distributional change. That is, the poor 
would benefit from growth more than proportionately. However, we have also found 
policies that present trade-offs in the sense that they push inequality and growth in 
different directions. Among these policies, one could mention cuts in the size of 
government, financial development, and trade openness.   
 
From a policy perspective, however, the weight given to the impact that a policy has on 
inequality is likely to be relative and to depend on the relative importance of inequality 
with respect to growth. The metric we use here is given by the overall impact of the 
policy on poverty as discussed in section II above
18. Furthermore, the framework 
reviewed allows us to discriminate between the short and long-run poverty impact of 
policies, something that is particularly appropriate in this context given that the estimated 
parameter of the lagged dependent variable in the inequality regressions is about 10 times 
the corresponding estimate for the income regression model (that is, given the different 
speeds of convergence). The presence of dynamics may eventually imply that policies 
that are pro-poor in the long run (in the sense that poverty falls as a result of their 
implementation) are not so pro-poor in the short run.  
 
Tables 7 to 10 present the net growth elasticities associated with those policies that 
present growth-inequality conflicts (government size, financial development, and trade 
openness) and also for three policies that do not present any such conflict (education, 
infrastructure and inflation). In tables 7 and 8 we do not allow for any feedback effect 
from inequality to growth or from income levels to changes in inequality. That is, tables 7 
and 8 are based on expressions (8) and (9). In tables 9 and 10 we allow for feedback from 
income levels to inequality. Thus these tables are based on expressions (12) and (13) with 
ξ =0.  Tables 7 and 9 focus on short-run impacts and tables 8 and 10 on the long run. In 
order to deal with the country specificity of the gross elasticity of poverty to growth and 
the elasticity of inequality to growth, we assume that income follows a log-normal 
distribution and present results based on the elasticities reported in table 1.  
 
                                                 
18 Admittedly, it is possible to find examples where expression (5) proves too general. For example,   
Ferreira and Leite (2003) present evidence for Brazil suggesting that the observed reductions in inequality 
during the 1990s were not beneficial to the bottom of the distribution.     -17-
Inspection of tables 7 and 9 suggests that in the short run, the net elasticity of poverty of 
the three policies that have growth and distributional change pushing in the same 
direction (i.e. education, infrastructure and lower inflation) is always negative. In other 
words, progress on those fronts would lead to lower poverty. It is worth noting that the 
different elasticities vary significantly depending on initial conditions as given by levels 
of development and inequality, something that would suggest that initial conditions 
matter when choosing policies designed to support a poverty reduction strategy. In the 
cases where growth and progressive distributional change tend to move in different 
directions, the sign of the elasticity would be negative in most cases. The exception is 
government size, where the sign depends on initial country conditions, with the growth 
effect dominating in poorer and more equal countries, and the inequality effect 
dominating in richer and more unequal countries. Thus, depending on the country's 
income level, fiscal adjustment is likely to have a different impact on poverty. 
 
When we focus on long-run elasticities (tables 8 and 10) the first conclusion we reach is 
that allowing for feedback effects from income levels to inequality does not alter the 
main result significantly: all the pro-growth policies would lead to reductions in poverty.  
This is regardless of the impact that these policies may have on inequality. In other 
words, in the long run, a pro-growth strategy will benefit the poor. Admittedly, it could 
be argued that, regardless of their long-run effect, the fact that some policies may 
temporarily increase poverty would be enough to exclude them from a poverty reduction 
strategy.  In this regard, there is a need for a couple of clarifications. First, there is some 
evidence (Gallego and Loayza (2002)) that economic development is likely to follow a 
multiplicative model where what matters is not only the "quantity" of an implemented 
policy but also the overall policy mix.  Thus it seems difficult to assume that a poverty 
reduction strategy can be uniquely based on policies such as education or infrastructure 
without addressing bottlenecks in other areas such as the financial sector, or external 
trade distortions. This would suggest that focusing on a few areas is likely to lead to 
disappointing results. Second, the equations above allow us to measure the impact of a 
policy change on poverty, other things being equal. However, assuming that other things 
are equal when there is growth seems unrealistic. Faster growth and therefore, higher per 
capita income levels, will in turn allow the implementation of education or infrastructure 
policies that would feed back into the growth process and also reduce inequality. Further, 
it is unlikely that investments in priority sectors could be significantly stepped up in the 
absence of additional growth that generates the required resources.  
 
That said, however, we do not want either to minimize the potential negative impact that 
some policies, even if temporarily, can have on poverty, especially when "temporary" in 
this context may refer to several years. In fact, we take the results of this paper as an 
indication of the need to support pro-growth policies but (i) taking into account the risks 
(in terms of short-run increases in poverty) that might be associated with reform 
programs and (ii) in parallel to pro-poor interventions that minimize the damage caused 
by the potential deterioration in income distribution.   
 
VII. Conclusions   
 
This paper has reviewed, from a cross-country perspective, the impact of a series of pro-
growth policies on inequality and headcount poverty. The main contributions of the paper 
to the literature are that it: (i) explores the poverty impact of a number of policies usually 
considered in the growth literature through the projected interaction of growth and   -18-
inequality; (ii) allows for the possibility of income and inequality dynamics which in turn 
allows for poverty dynamics; (iii) relies on a large database of non-overlapping five-year 
averages that mitigates to some extent the problems encountered when the distribution of 
surveys across countries is very unequal (countries with 40 surveys against others with 
just 1 or 2); and (iv) allows for fixed effects in a dynamic panel framework. 
 
The findings of the paper suggest the likelihood of inequality convergence, and that the 
speed of convergence for inequality is faster than the speed of convergence for per capita 
income levels. On the growth-inequality links, we find a Kuznets type of relationship by 
which inequality would increase with income levels up to about $3,000 (1985 US dollars) 
and decrease thereafter, and find no significant evidence of inequality affecting growth. 
Admittedly, the point estimate for inequality comes close to being significant at the 10 
percent level, suggesting that higher inequality would lead to lower growth. 
 
On the policy front, we find that improvements in education and infrastructure and lower 
inflation levels would lead to both growth and progressive distributional change. 
Financial development, trade openness, and cuts in the size of the government, all 
policies that would lead to faster growth, would be associated with increases in 
inequality. We also find that financial crises would be associated with reductions in 
inequality. 
 
On the interaction between growth and inequality, the paper argues that in the short run, 
the positive impact on growth of the identified win-lose policies would not be enough to 
offset the negative impact they have on inequality and therefore, in the absence of pro-
poor policies that accompany those reforms or additional feedback effects from growth 
(such as improvements in education or infrastructure), poverty could actually increase. In 
the long run, however, we find that the growth impact of these policies would offset the 
negative impact on distribution, and therefore poverty would fall as a result of the 
implementation of pro-growth policies. These findings would justify the adoption of: (i) a 
pro-growth policy package at the center of any poverty reduction strategy, and (ii) pro-
poor measures that complement such a package and avoid to the extent possible potential 
short-run increases in poverty. 
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Table 1. Theoretical Elasticities under log-normal assumption 
      Growth Elasticity   
PL
a / Gini   0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6 
.16  -6.2 -3.3  -2  -1.2 
.33  -4 -2.2  -1.3  -0.9 
.50  -2.8 -1.6  -1  -0.7 
.66  -2.1 -1.2 -0.8 -0.5 
.90  -1.4 -0.9 -0.6 -0.4 
      Inequality Elasticity   
PL
a / Gini   0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6 
.16  12.9 7.7  5.3  4 
.33  5.2 3.3 2.4  2 
.50  2.5 1.7 1.4 1.2 
.66  1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 
.90  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
                     a Poverty line as a share of per capita GDP. Source Lopez and Serven (2004). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  S.D.  Max  Min 
log(Gini)  -.977 0.269 -.296 -1.79 
∆log(Gini)  0.001 0.034 0.128 -0.164 
log(GDP)  7.931 1.043 10.61  5.38 
Growth  0.016 0.038 0.276 -0.229 
Education  3.438 1.076 5.024 -.518 
Financial  depth  -1.465 1.015 0.734 -8.205 
Trade  openness  0.016 0.542 2.308 -1.877 
Government burden -1.928  0.432  -.539  -4.444 
Public  Infrastructure 3.329 1.923 6.681 -1.608 
Governance -.002  1.706  3.468  -3.256 
Price  Stability  4.768 0.406 8.797 4.405 
Cyclical  Volatility 0.025 0.021 0.316 0.002 
External  imbalances 4.664 0.384 7.210 3.406 
Banking  crisis  0.050 0.188 1.000 0.000 
External  conditions -0.006 0.045 0.187 -0.212 
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Table 3 Inequality and income levels
a 
Dependent Variable ∆log(Gini)     Estimation   Method       




Lagged  Inequality    -0.0312  -0.175  -0.111 -0.198 -0.213 
      (-4.26)  (-10.22)  (-2.16) (-4.18) (-4.47) 
Initial  Income  -0.003 -0.007 -0.018  -0.009  -0.021 
     (-1.27)  (-.74)  (-.69)  (-.44)  (-1.02) 
Summary  Statistics           
   N      252  252  172  172  172 
   F (p val)    0  0  0.37     
   Sargan (p val)          0.4  0.68 
   Second order correlation (p val)           0.27  0.16 
aAll regressions include time dummies. t-statistics in parentheses. 
 bInstruments are: lagged growth and lagged inequality. 
cArellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, treating initial GDP as an exogenous variable. 
 dArellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, treating initial GDP as a pre-determined variable. 
 
Table 4.  Growth and inequality
a 
Dependent Variable ∆log(Y)   Estimation    Method     




Initial  Income  0.002  -0.035  -0.016 -0.075 -0.067 
  (1.09)  (-5.38)  (-1.64) (-3.09) (-3.20) 
Inequality  -0.008  0.011  -0.021 -0.008 -0.004 
 (-1.41)  (1.03)  (-1.48)  (-.615)  (-.18) 
Summary Statistics          
   N  387  387  117  222  222 
   F (p val)  0.00  0.00  .51     
   Sargan (p val)        .18  0.03 
   Second order correlation (p val)        .69  0.25 
     
aAll regressions include time dummies. t-statistics in parentheses. 
         bInstruments are: three lagged growth and three lagged inequality observations. 
         cArellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, treating inequality as an exogenous variable. 
         dArellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, treating inequality as a pre-determined variable. 
 
Table 5. Growth and inequality
a 
Depend. Variable ∆log(Y)     Sample     

















Initial income     -0.065  -0.040  -0.028  -0.071  -0.015  -0.033 
     (-5.19)  (-1.60)  (-2.15)  (-6.08)  (-0.81)  (-2.76) 
Inequality     0.014  0.031  -0.027  0.017  0.022  -0.006 
     (.628)  (1.11)  (-1.57)  (0.80)  (0.68)  (-0.27) 
Summary statstics              
  Number of countries    14  33  23  14  33  23 
  Number of observations  40  101  91  40  101  91 
  Sargan (p val)    0.25  0.06  0.98  0.76  0.23  0.67 
  Second order correl. (p val)  0.58  0.77  0.76  0.58  0.66  0.94 
aAll regressions include time dummies. t-statistics in parentheses. 
bArellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, treating inequality as an exogenous variable.  
bArellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, treating inequality as a pre-determined variable.   -24-
   Table 6. Determinants of growth and distribution
a 
   Growth Growth  ∆log(Gini)  ∆log(Gini)  ∆log(Gini) 
lagged Inequality      -0.242  -0.224  -0.227 
Log(Gini)     (-13.32)  (-11.98)  (-12.03) 
Inequality   -0.007       
Log(Gini)   (1.66)       
Initial GDP per capita  -0.018  -.125    -.031  .438 
(logs)   (-3.80)  (-13.44)  (-2.42)  (-2.24)  (6.23) 
Initial GDP per capita squared          -0.027 
(logs -squared)          (-6.93) 
Initial output gap  -0.237  -0.165    0.041   
(log actual/potential GDP)  (-8.52)  (5.84)    (0.77)   
Education 0.017  0.017  -0.022  -0.017  -0.025 
(log secondary enrollment)  (6.70)  (3.99)  (-2.77)  (-1.72)  (-2.50) 
Financial depth  0.006  0.011  0.014  0.013  0.012 
(log private domestic credit/GDP)  (4.28)  (4.04)  (2.83)  (2.91)  (3.30) 
Trade openness  0.010  0.004  0.024  0.024  0.037 
(log adjusted trade volume/GDP)  (3.14)  (0.69)  (3.04)  (2.69)  (4.13) 
Government burden  -0.015  -0.014  -0.018  -0.015  -0.015 
(log government consumption/GDP)  (-3.18)  (-4.11)  (-2.71)  (-2.17)  (-1.75) 
Public Infrastructure  0.007  0.001  -0.016  -0.010  -0.025 
(log per capita telephone lines)  (2.71)  (0.27)  (-3.32)  (-1.59)  (-4.67) 
Governance -0.001  0.006  0.005  0.006  0.006 
(principal component ICRG)  (-0.68)  (4.63)  (1.74)  (2.02)  (2.21) 
Price Stability  -0.005  -0.007  0.008  0.009  0.008 
(log [100 + inflation rate])  (-1.89)  (-3.08)  (2.16)  (2.87)  (2.83) 
Cyclical Volatility  -0.277  -0.242  0.112  0.228  0.258 
(std output gap)  (-3.76)  (-4.30)  (1.41)  (2.22)  (2.48) 
External imbalances  -0.006  -0.010  -0.002  -0.003  0.003 
(log Dollar index)  (-3.90)  (-3.36)  (-0.32)  (-0.52)  (0.50) 
Banking crisis  -0.029  -0.015  -0.021  -0.022  -0.022 
(frequency of years)  (-7.42)  (-4.11)  (-4.02)  (-4.23)  (-5.12) 
External conditions  0.072  0.071  0.051  0.029  0.059 
(growth rate of TOT)  (4.98)  (6.32)  (1.87)  (1.05)  (2.16) 
Summary statistics           
               Number of countries  78  48  41  41  41 
               Number of observations  350  165  134  133  134 
               Sargan (p value)  .99  .43  .76  .78  .88 
               Second order correlation (p value)   .46  .21  .43  .43  .40 
 
a The models are estimated with time dummies using Arellano and Bond (1991) two step GMM estimator. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. All regressions include time dummies.   -25-
 
Table 7. Net short-run growth elasticiticies of poverty to selected policies
b 
   Education      Finan. Development 
PL
a/Gini 0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6 PL
a/Gini 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.16  -0.39 -0.23 -0.15 -0.11  0.16  0.14 0.09 0.06 0.05 
0.33  -0.18 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06  0.33  0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 
0.5  -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04  0.5  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.66  -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03  0.66  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.9  -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  0.9  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Trade Openness     Government Burden 
PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6  PL
a/Gini 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.16  0.25 0.15 0.11 0.08  0.16  -0.14 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 
0.33  0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04  0.33  -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
0.5  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.5  0.00 -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
0.66  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.66  0.01 0.00 0.00  -0.01 
0.9  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.9  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
    Infrastructure      Inflation 
PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6  PL
a/Gini 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.16  -0.25 -0.15 -0.10 -0.07  0.16  0.13 0.08 0.05 0.04 
0.33  -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04  0.33  0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 
0.5  -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02  0.5  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
0.66  -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  0.66  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.9  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.9  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
           
a Poverty line as a share of per capita GDP 
                 b Under the assumption of  log-normal distribution.   -26-
 
Table 8. Net long-run growth elasticiticies of poverty to selected policies
b 
   Education      Finan. Development 
PL
a/Gini 0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6 PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4  0.5  0.6 
0.16  -7.03 -3.82 -2.37 -1.50  0.16  -1.32 -0.65  -0.36  -0.17 
0.33  -4.25 -2.38 -1.45 -1.03  0.33  -1.03 -0.54  -0.29  -0.18 
0.5  -2.87 -1.67 -1.07 -0.77  0.5  -0.79 -0.43  -0.25  -0.16 
0.66  -2.09 -1.22 -0.83 -0.54  0.66  -0.63 -0.35  -0.22  -0.12 
0.9  -1.36 -0.89 -0.60 -0.41  0.9  -0.44 -0.28  -0.18  -0.11 
   Trade Openness     Government Burden 
PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6  PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4  0.5  0.6 
0.16  -2.17 -1.07 -0.59 -0.27  0.16  4.21 2.18  1.27  0.70 
0.33  -1.71 -0.89 -0.48 -0.30  0.33  2.95 1.59  0.90  0.60 
0.5  -1.31 -0.72 -0.42 -0.27  0.5  2.15 1.21  0.73  0.49 
0.66  -1.05 -0.58 -0.37 -0.20  0.66  1.66 0.93  0.61  0.36 
0.9  -0.74 -0.46 -0.29 -0.18  0.9  1.14 0.72  0.47  0.30 
    Infrastructure      Inflation 
PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6  PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4  0.5  0.6 
0.16  -3.26 -1.79 -1.13 -0.73  0.16  2.15 1.17  0.73  0.47 
0.33  -1.90 -1.07 -0.66 -0.48  0.33  1.28 0.72  0.44  0.32 
0.5  -1.25 -0.73 -0.48 -0.35  0.5  0.86 0.50  0.32  0.23 
0.66  -0.90 -0.53 -0.36 -0.25  0.66  0.62 0.36  0.25  0.17 
0.9  -0.57 -0.38 -0.26 -0.18  0.9  0.40 0.26  0.18  0.12 
           
a Poverty line as a share of per capita GDP 
                 b Under the assumption of  log-normal distribution. 
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Table 9. Net short-run growth elasticiticies of poverty to selected policies
b 
   Education      Finan. Development 
PL
a/Gini 0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6 PL
a/Gini 0.3  0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.16  -0.32 -0.19 -0.12 -0.09  0.16  0.13  0.08 0.06 0.04 
0.33  -0.16 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05  0.33  0.04  0.03 0.02 0.02 
0.5  -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03  0.5  0.02  0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.66  -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02  0.66  0.00  0.00 0.01 0.01 
0.9  -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01  0.9  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Trade Openness     Government Burden 
PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6  PL
a/Gini  0.3  0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.16  0.25 0.15 0.11 0.08  0.16  -0.10  -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 
0.33  0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04  0.33  -0.02  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
0.5  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.5  0.00 0.00  -0.01  -0.01 
0.66  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.66  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.9  0.02  0.01 0.00 0.00 
    Infrastructure      Inflation 
PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6  PL
a/Gini  0.3  0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.16  -0.17 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05  0.16  0.15  0.09 0.06 0.04 
0.33  -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03  0.33  0.07  0.04 0.03 0.02 
0.5  -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02  0.5  0.04  0.02 0.02 0.01 
0.66  -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01  0.66  0.02  0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.9  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.9  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 
           
a Poverty line as a share of per capita GDP 
                 b Under the assumption of  log-normal distribution.   -28-
 
Table 10. Net long-run growth elasticiticies of poverty to selected policies
b 
   Education      Finan. Development 
PL
a/Gini 0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6 PL
a/Gini  0.3  0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.16  -8.52 -4.71 -2.98 -1.96  0.16  -1.91  -1.01 -0.60 -0.35 
0.33  -4.85 -2.76 -1.72 -1.26  0.33  -1.27  -0.69 -0.40 -0.28 
0.5  -3.16 -1.86 -1.23 -0.91  0.5  -0.90  -0.51 -0.32 -0.22 
0.66  -2.23 -1.32 -0.92 -0.64  0.66  -0.69  -0.39 -0.26 -0.16 
0.9  -1.40 -0.93 -0.65 -0.46  0.9  -0.46  -0.30 -0.20 -0.13 
   Trade Openness     Government Burden 
PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6  PL
a/Gini  0.3  0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.16  -3.05 -1.60 -0.95 -0.55  0.16  5.79  3.12 1.92 1.19 
0.33  -2.06 -1.12 -0.65 -0.44  0.33  3.58  1.99 1.20 0.85 
0.5  -1.48 -0.84 -0.51 -0.35  0.5  2.45  1.42 0.90 0.64 
0.66  -1.13 -0.64 -0.42 -0.25  0.66  1.81  1.04 0.71 0.46 
0.9  -0.77 -0.49 -0.32 -0.21  0.9  1.19  0.77 0.52 0.35 
    Infrastructure      Inflation 
PL
a/Gini  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6  PL
a/Gini  0.3  0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.16  -3.68 -2.04 -1.30 -0.86  0.16  2.74  1.52 0.97 0.65 
0.33  -2.07 -1.18 -0.74 -0.55  0.33  1.52  0.87 0.55 0.41 
0.5  -1.34 -0.79 -0.53 -0.39  0.5  0.97  0.58 0.39 0.29 
0.66  -0.93 -0.56 -0.39 -0.27  0.66  0.68  0.40 0.29 0.20 
0.9  -0.58 -0.39 -0.27 -0.19  0.9  0.42  0.28 0.20 0.14 
           
a Poverty line as a share of per capita GDP 
                 b Under the assumption of  log-normal distribution. 
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Poverty Income (a=-.1, b=.3) Inequality  (a=-.3, b=.6)